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RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A HABERMASIAN QUESTIONING  





Abstract: The task of this paper is to clarify the notion of pluralism and religious pluralism 
against the background of disputations on the globalized challenges of religious pluralism, 
for example the incompatibility between different conceptions of religious pluralism, 
especially from the lens of a possible conversation on religious pluralism between Jürgen 
Habermas and Emmanuel Levinas. With a detailed reading into the development of the 
conceptualization of religious pluralism in each author, addressing the questions such as 
what is genuine pluralism and on what ground the conflicts within religious pluralism can 
be re-accounted, we make our passage from challenging the total reliance on political 
unification by the effort of Habermas, towards adopting a Levinasian alternative path that 
prioritizes ethical relation over individual ways of plurality in the realization of each one’s 
good life. Even though it can be acknowledged that Habermas raised the right question 
against the relativism way of seeing pluralism, it is by Levinas, the ontological ground of 
pluralism and the universal dimension of the plural are thought not only through justice 
and politics but more importantly, through a way of responding to the non-familiar 
tradition with love, where human religion has a single dimension that is the 
transcendental notion of charity and love. 
 
Key Words: Religious pluralism, Jürgen Habermas, Emmanuel Levinas, the proviso 
translation, face-to-face encounter, peace, love. 
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1. Introduction 
In the contemporary world the concept of religious pluralism is 
highly problematic. Disagreements over how we best lay the foundation of 
the inclusive-pluralistic society are manifold. The religious expressions 
often impart choices on the political arena, and these choices sometimes 
clash. The task of dealing with this challenge, and negotiating this 
religious plurality, is complicated due to the incompatible approaches 
addressing religious pluralism. This problem calls for careful examination 
on the idea and nature of dealing with religious pluralism. Several answers 
have been formulated in this line of questioning, and in this article we will 
first of all examine the problematic conception of religious pluralism 
which sometimes risks catalysing relativism, before turning to explore the 
Habermasian ideas on addressing religious pluralism through rational 
political unification. We will though show the existing problems in the 
Habermasian approach, which lead us to find a way to address this 
problem from the point of view of Emmanuel Levinas. The unique notion 
of pluralism in Levinas shows us an alternative way to see religious plu-
ralism. Instead of searching for a way to unify the sometimes conflicting 
practices of different religions, Levinas offers us a model to perceive 
pluralism based upon face-to-face encounter, which prioritizes peace, a 
peace that is achieved through responding to the other religion with 
charity and love. We will begin with a brief discussion of the problems in 
the contemporary discussions on religious pluralism which will be shown 
as lacking of willingness to search for a dimension for solidarity as well as 
an ontological unexamined philosophical conceptualization. 
2. The problems of religious pluralism in the contemporary world 
Understanding the concept of religious pluralism is a complex 
matter, and confusion often arises in the appearance of various incom-
patible conceptions that appear in the modern society. Religious pluralism 
is commonly referred to the coexistence of religious and secular indivi-
duals and worldviews. The mainstream idea of religious pluralism rejects 
privileging any value of one religion over others to avoid any prejudices. 
In liberal political tradition, pluralism is often seen as a fact or as an 
instrumental value (Galston 2002, 26-27). The liberal society has to uphold 
pluralism in order to achieve societal stability, which is presented in the 
genealogy of pluralism as a natural consequence of autonomous reason 
within the democratic system (Rawls 2005, 48-63). After the Enlighten-
ment, philosophers praise diversities and pluralism without reservation. 
John Stuart Mill argues that the (religious) pluralism serves our search for 
truth, which is helpful to develop our individuality, which is also essential 
to social progress (Mill 1991). And in contemporary thoughts, according to 
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John Rawls, autonomous reasoning and plurality are compatible and com-
plementary in liberalism which provide the fundamental provisions 
needed for this pluralism to thrive (Rawls 1971, 2005). Within these 
approaches, we clearly sense that they imply a certain value neutrality, 
which develops into the relative conception of all are welcomed, where 
the values are not properly examined in their own context. However, 
these values are sometimes in conflict and therefore we are forced to 
choose from a diversity of competing choices. Ultimately this choice is a 
choice among anonymous possibilities, which is a choice intimately 
connected with pluralism that dismisses the particular value, which 
underlines the freedom found in liberal states (Raz 1986, 17). 
The contemporary discourse on religious pluralism is often presented 
as, firstly, the coexisting of various religious traditions, where the focus of 
disagreement is placed on which religion, dogma or worship, provides a 
‘true’ belief, which should be seen as the primary source of divination. It is 
also discussed in an inter-religious manner, where difference of opinions 
regarding specific texts, event, ritual or practice within the same (sin-
gular) tradition is the main locus. But perhaps most commonly in today’s 
discourse, religious pluralism refers to the coexistence of religious and 
secular individuals and worldviews. In this third approach, whether we 
understand ‘religion’ as living a ‘religious life’, or having certain religious 
beliefs, or as differentiated opinions on what is ‘the good life’. They are, to 
echo Charles Taylor, all merely an option among many in our contem-
porary societies (Taylor 2007). Liberal societies are struggling to evaluate 
the characteristics of any given value, including the religious values that 
are ancient and has innate conflicts with values promoted by the En-
lightenment. In order to be able to coexist with secular values in a post-
secular society in a similar fashion, religious values are whether treated 
without historical context or being ignored as false value. A dilemma may 
rise when the value of a person’s religion is in conflict with his or her civil 
responsibility. This is because, in the post-secular society, the value, or 
judgement, of a religion is not to be found in its apparent inherent 
properties, but rather in the valuation of the persons who insert value 
upon its practice. The individual’s experience of religious pluralism in a 
liberal society does not only lead to the realisation that one’s conception 
of ‘good’ is merely an option amongst many (Taylor 2007, 2-3), which 
rather leads, inadvertently, to a threatening of the authority of the idea of 
the ‘good’ itself (Mehta 2008, 77). Francis Schuessler Fiorenza acknow-
ledges this notion as he eloquently asserts that religious beliefs in modern 
societies are principally “based upon personal convictions rather than 
upon authority” (Fiorenza 1992, 74). The problem is that it is futile for 
post-secular societies to proclaim that they are able to respect and protect 
anything beyond the individual’s rights, and is much less protective of 
whatever the person praises and invest value to. 
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3. A Habermasian questioning of religious pluralism and its 
pragmatic consideration 
The philosopher Jürgen Habermas has spent much of his academic 
career on paving the way of articulating how the civic society, govern-
ment and transnational organizations may approach the dilemma of so-
ciety’s place in mediating between conflicting and competing value choi-
ces and worldviews of its citizens. In his seminal work The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas established an account of moder-
nity as the result of a two-fold (Ashenden 1998, 119) process of rationalisa-
tion (Habermas 1984, 73-74; Habermas 1987). Habermas anchored this ap-
proach by Max Weber’s vision of the ‘iron cage’ via a ‘Western Marxist 
tradition’ in dealing with the term reification (Habermas 1984, xxxvii), in 
order to set forth the relationship between system and lifeworld in his 
account of this rationalisation. Concurrently with this process of rationa-
lisation follows a pluralisation of forms of life which shatters previous 
taken-for-granted meanings and truths. Habermas argues that such a 
process of pluralisation or ‘disenchantment’ brings with it a linguistifi-
cation of the sacred (Habermas 1984, 141), which entails a rationalisation 
of the lifeworld, in other words, an undermining of shared background 
suppositions. This linguistification of the sacred opens up our shared 
notions to an increasing number of contested concerns and critical 
questioning, which leads to a growing need for justification (Habermas 
1996, 97). According to Habermas, agreement among these contested 
values can be reached through explicit rational argumentation (Habermas 
1996). Communicative rationality develops telelogically toward a more 
rational discourse, a mutual understanding, which challenges the original 
value of the various religious expressions. His theory roots the democratic 
practice in and through this discussion, resulting in the abolishment of 
infringements, and colonization of the individual’s lifeworld, which 
unleashes the modern societies from previous cultural and ideological 
constrains. In other words, the ideas of his early works rest on the 
capacity of the actors within society, and on their successful rational 
argumentation. Such profoundly open communication in society would 
clearly combat fundamentalism which essentially is the “refusal of 
dialogue”, to resound Anthony Giddens’s (Giddens 1994) sentiments.  
Habermas’s dealing of religious pluralism through communicative 
rationality takes its importance from the perspective of the intercon-
nectedness between religion and politics and the decisiveness of the 
political dimension in the public sphere: 
[…]in the process of its democratic transforma-
tion, ‘the political’ has not completely lost its asso-
ciation with religion. In democratic discourse se-
cular and religious citizens stand in a complemen-
tary relation. Both are involved in an interaction 
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that is constitutive for a democratic process sprin-
ging from the soil of civil society and developing 
through the informal communication networks of 
the public sphere. (Habermas 2011, 27) 
With the acknowledgement of the importance of religion and its 
coexistence for a functional society, Habermas admits that the coexistence 
between secular and religious values cannot be guaranteed through rely-
ing heavily upon individuals to partake in rational arguments and finding 
consensus in questions of religious truths and values. He turns to the in-
terconnectedness of religion and the political in search for a more suitable 
approach. Habermas maintains that there is innately a dimension of 
religion in politics; religion and politics cannot be discussed indepen-
dently from each other (Habermas 2011, 18). He argues that, a middle-
ground position between the secular and religious participants had to be 
constructed, a path which he termed as the institutional translation proviso 
(Habermas 2011, 25-26), which contributes in the end to the political 
sphere. The proviso entails a translation of the religious arguments, 
religious reasons, into secular reason that is accessible to the political 
arena. In other words, the proviso works as an indispensable filter 
between the informal public discourse of debate, and the formal discourse 
of decision-making in parliaments or governments, which must be agreed 
upon via secular-rational argumentation politically. Through the shift 
from the focus of the micro-level of the individual to a macro-level located 
in politics, Habermas asserts that through politics in the democratic post-
secular society, necessary provisions for resolving conflicts are made 
(Habermas 2006, 22-23).  
Jürgen Habermas is certainly correct in emphasising the importance 
of rationality and the political dimension in solving conflicts within 
religious pluralism, however, there are existing problems in his approach. 
First of all, the context of religious pluralism is essentially a modern value 
emerging from the Enlightenment, in other words, a value originating 
from a discursive structure where Abrahamic traditions have been dis-
credited (Erlewine 2006, 23-27). To situate a rational argumentation within 
this context infringes the religions that do not share values with the 
Enlightenment. Either the individual can embrace this religious pluralism 
context which contradicts with her tradition, or the individual needs to 
assert a more robust interpretation of her religion (Erlewine 2006, 28-29). 
Habermas’s insistence on the need of rational actors engaged in mutual-
opened dialogue in order to shape the public discourse, is facing severe 
questioning as it is not feasible to locate a consensus while accommo-
dating religious plurality and at the same time hold an authoritative 
account of one’s religion. Furthermore, in the religious pluralistic milieu, a 
context of pluralist theologies implies a predetermination of the results of 
interfaith dialogue, thus making dialogue superfluous. For this reason, 
having an open mind to other religious truths seem empty, and no Haber-
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masian rational argumentation would be able to tackle the question of 
religious pluralism.  
Secondly, to rely solely on politics to ensure peaceful coexisting and 
religious pluralism seems implausible, as the middle-path approach of the 
institutional translation proviso entails that all argumentation in the 
public sphere has to be in a secular-rational fashion, which already limits 
the religious value within the rational category thus undermines the 
neutrality of the condition of the communicative actions. Even though a 
certain adaptation can be identified throughout Habermas’s works chro-
nologically, where a strong desire to address the incompatibility between 
religion and secular and reach a modus vivendi is apparent in his later 
writing, a more inclusive way towards possible universal peace between 
religious plurality and secular civic society does not take part in his 
theoretical framework. The consequential peace built on pluralism in his 
more pragmatic considerations (Habermas 2006, 41-43) does not attain 
true neutrality but only to avoid the contextualization of each religion. As 
Charles Taylor points out: “the point of state neutrality is precisely to 
avoid favoring or disfavoring not just religious positions but any basic 
position, religious or nonreligious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, 
but also religion over against nonbelief in religion or vice versa” (Habermas 
2011, 37). Such avoidance is also experienced by many believers who are 
coming to the conclusion that liberal post-secular societies acknowledges 
them as individuals, but not their beliefs (Mehta 2008, 84-87). Where do we 
turn next, when Habermasian pragmatics fail? 
4. Levinas’s conception of pluralism and religious pluralism 
The Habermasian way of addressing the issue of pluralism of religion 
through the rational and the political is problematic, which fails to recog-
nize the ultimate value of religion. And the very process of integration at 
the political prioritizes the political decisiveness which can legitimate 
certain constrains on traditional religious practice and neglects the real 
appeal of the believers. More profoundly, the Habermasian approach has 
an un-examined ontological presupposition on pluralism, especially 
referring to another famous philosopher who holds critical view to such 
ontological centred approach, Emmanuel Levinas, Habermas’s way of 
addressing pluralism only offers an immanent picture. Even though it is 
hard to find any direct comment on Habermas from Levinas, what is 
Levinas’s possible way of addressing religious pluralism comparing to 
Habermas is an intriguing question.   
Next, we will turn to examine Levinas’s ideas on the question of 
religious pluralism, which hopefully offers an initiative point for an onto-
logically alternative approach to religious pluralism. It is undeniable that 
Levinas has concrete views on the specific issues of religious pluralism in 
his writing, especially on the historical events at his time involving 
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relationship between the Jewish, Christian and Islamic religious traditions 
(Levinas 1990, 1999). But in the current discussion, we will not focus on his 
specific judgments as these judgments all have historical limitation. We 
will rather explore how the Levinasian pluralism, which will be argued as 
a pluralism of face-to-face encounter, can offer an alternative approach 
towards pluralism of religion in our globalized world that brings about 
peace.  
As both Stella Sandford and Simon Critchley claim, pluralism in 
Levinas should be set aside from the mainstream view on pluralism 
(including the Habermasian one) where pluralism is seen as a “plurality of 
subjects” (individuals) that exist (Sandford 2000, 67; Critchley 2015, 99). 
Critchley singles out an attempt to question the presuppositions of such 
pluralism in Levinas, and concludes this critique as, the “manifold 
individuals” are only the same to one another and are simply forces for 
self-preservation (Critchley 2015, 99). This critique can be explained 
further from two aspects. Firstly, the mainstream way to conceive 
plurality does not acknowledge individuals as non-replicable and ignores 
the contextualization of the specific values. The formal way of descripting 
one in the plural presupposes that the identity of one can be put in a 
paralleled position as the identity of another. In this approach, not only 
the uniqueness of one that separates it from the “all” is missing, the 
specific life span of the one, which is captured by the term diachrony by 
Levinas, is also reduced to the postulated presence of an individual at the 
time of the theorization.  Levinas names the pluralism in the western 
tradition as a plural “given as a number” (Levinas 1979, 274) where the 
numerical different individuals are in fact presupposed by a monism of 
logics, which is more specifically the logics of synthesis. The logics of 
synthesis show itself in different forms, for example, the cogito, the 
presence etc., which hold the logic of the same as “ontologically 
privileged” and do not allow any absolute alterity beyond them (Levinas 
1979, 274).  
The second aspect of Levinas’s critique emphasizes the negligence of 
the notion of pluralism in western tradition of the importance of the face-
to-face encounter between one and the other within the plural. The 
conceptualization of plurality that only accounts the factual existences of 
the multiple individuals does not properly address the priority of relation-
ship between them. From a Levinasian perspective, the Habermasian 
dealing of “reasonable pluralism” (Hendrik 2010, 20) is based upon a 
sociality that is wrongly perceived as mechanical combination of indivi-
dual. Levinas stresses that, sociality should rather be seen as composed by 
the face-to-face encounter between one and the other, which is primarily 
an ethical relation and concrete event of responsibility. The content of the 
reasonable pluralism as each individual’s pursue of good life for them-
selves rather exhibits a prioritization of egoistic interest, where the 
sociality of ‘for the other’ is only secondary and often alienated by the 
Lars Rhodin, Xin Mao Religious Pluralism 
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, vol. 16, issue 46 (Spring 2017)  56 
egology (Levinas 1979).  
Levinas proposes a sociality that is based upon the response one has 
for the other which establishes the foundation for a pluralism that 
recognizes and prioritizes the ethical dimension within the plural. And as 
Michael Morgan argues, Levinas’s discussion on the “I” other relation can 
be expanded to accommodate more concrete others, for example, “other 
cultures, ways of life” or other religions, (Morgan 2007, 259) in which case, 
the notion of pluralism of Levinas can offer us concrete understanding on 
religious pluralism as well.  
To be exact, the notion of pluralism appears with frequency in 
Levinas’s early major work Totality and Infinity where Levinas, after making 
clear his critique on the pluralism in western philosophical tradition, 
brings about his own notion of pluralism, which is distinctive from “the 
numerical multiplicity” (Levinas 1979, 220), a pluralism that is built upon 
the one as a subject rather than the one as an individual. To be brief, the 
Levinasian subject is ultimately different from an individual with con-
scious, a cogito; rather, it is designated as “surplus of sociality”, which is 
further defined as the very welcome of the stranger. This plurality of 
subject refuses the unified measurement based upon representation, 
knowledge, especially truth produced by this representation, and 
transcends the immanence of logics of the same (Levinas 1979, 221).  As 
Corey Beals points out, the pluralism based upon subject for the other in 
Levinas opens up the totality of the same, where the other characterized 
as transcending any knowledge of the presence introduces the dimension 
of transcendence to the immanent multiple of the egoistic same (2007, 
110). 
One can find in Totality and Infinity an expansion of this alternative 
notion of pluralism through introducing the concept of fecundity (Levinas, 
1979). Even though Luce Irigaray and Simon Critchley criticize the Levina-
sian concept of fecundity from the feminist perspective (Irigaray 2001, 
119; Critchley, 1998), Sandford endeavours to discern the ontological 
importance of this notion from its biological origin. According to Sand-
ford, to assume that the philosophical notion of fecundity has its origin 
from the biological fecundity “loses the sense in which the discussion is 
phenomenologically based and existentially intended” (Sandford 2000, 70). 
Even though it is still questionable that the sexism connotation of the very 
wording of fecundity can be totally dismissed this way, the philosophical 
significance of fecundity indeed outlines the structure of the transcen-
dence of pluralism, especially in concern of time.  
The father-son relation offers a perspective of plural that is a relation 
of “trans-substantiation” where the “I”, the father, is “in the child, an 
other” (Levinas 1979, 267). To establish the notion of pluralism through 
fecundity, namely an ontological structure of “our relation to and through 
the child”, (Critchley 2015, 105) makes the plurality prior to our existence, 
which is to say, as someone’s child, we are born with “plural facticity” 
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(Critchley 2015, 105). Identity and alterity are not “logically incompatible” 
(Sandford 2005, 382) anymore, and in this way the innate conflicts, to 
which pluralism can lead, is also properly addressed. As Michael Fagenblat 
rightly points out, through the notion of fecundity, Levinas offers us a 
unique way to see how it is possible to orient towards a “new interlocutor” 
without conflicting against or assimilating it (Fagenblat 2010, 93). 
Yet one notices that, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s approach 
towards pluralism appears to be apolitical compared to the Habermasian 
discourse where the political institutions are not addressed as much as the 
family relations. It is in his works after Totality and Infinity, especially in his 
later major work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas includes 
the political and judicial importance via bringing forward the significance 
of the notion of the third party. When the subject is equally “confronted 
by the face of the other and the third”, the question of ethics becomes a 
question of justice (Simmons 1999, 83). The demand of justice calls for 
judicial system and the political institutions, where calculation of each 
individual based upon the universal category is needed. The politics that 
Levinas proposes, despite that it is inspired by ethics, has the same form as 
any other politics—a place of togetherness with contemporariness of all 
the individuals and comparison between right or wrong. Thus for this 
moment in Levinas, the Levinasian pluralism seems to be comparable to 
the Habermasian one where the system of justice decides the existence of 
plurality, where religious pluralism would be secondary to the judicial 
system.  
However, as soon as admitting the importance of the judicial system, 
Levinas immediately stresses that this system is constantly disrupted by a 
dimension of transcendence, the ethical significance of any political ex-
pression, from which one can see that, different from Habermas, the 
political does not have the final saying in Levinas.  For Levinas, even 
though the political can serve ethics via offering justice to the third party, 
it is a system with immanent interest-calculating which not only violates 
the transcendence of the face-to face ethical relation, but also brings back 
the totality of the same, that is a law written indifferently towards each 
individual. Levinas condemns war with “good conscience” (Levinas 1998, 
160), and in judicial system violence cannot be avoided and the 
responsibility for the other becomes an indifference that only gives way to 
law. Totality of law, even though beginning by care for the other, turns 
the plural into pieces of empirical truth with multiple dimensions that 
does not prioritize the ethical value anymore.  
The political discourse allows diversified meanings that are limited 
by the rationality of the presentation and cognition, which is lacking of a 
sense that can respond to the other human with care. This is to say, the 
universal dimension that addresses conflicts in religious pluralism is not 
rationality nor political decisiveness. Michael Morgan claims that one can 
find an implicit universal dimension in Levinas from his promotion of 
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“ethics of care and responsibility” (Morgan 2007, 259). He maintains, even 
though Levinas committed to “a plurality of worldviews or interpretive 
frameworks”, there is “room for a basic, orienting ethical demand” in his 
ideas, which serves as a ground to the communication of the plural 
(Morgan 2007, 260). 
The exact wording “ground” is risky to be used to describe Levinas’s 
philosophy, as Levinas is always against the theoretical way of a ground 
searching process. To be exact, Levinas criticizes the way of finding a 
ground for the world that is “before all that is supports”, which as “an 
astronomic world of perception” leads to totality of the same (Levinas 
1998b, 88). Nevertheless, Levinas does use the French notion of en deça, 
(Levinas 1998, xxv) which indicates, in a diachronic way, an immemorial 
past that inspires the presence. This immemorial past cannot be recovered 
in the presence to be attributed as the origin, which yet disturbs the 
immanence of the presence. This immemorial past denotes the presence 
with the ethical significance, which is more exactly in Levinas a unique 
sense through which all the plural meanings can signify.   
Levinas points out, notions such as Merleau Ponty’s “fundamental 
historicity”, equalize the ideal with the plural ways of interpreting the 
unique sense of the ideal of transcendence. Transcendence in this case is 
always in the process of “coming into contact in a common world” (Le-
vinas 1996, 43) where the transcendence is only interpreted via the com-
mon world. Even though it should be acknowledged that cultures, lan-
guages or different religions are translatable to one and other (or into the 
secular discourse), Levinas emphasizes that the motivation behind the 
opening of one tradition to the other, the initiation of any translation is 
often ignored behind the horizontal account of the multiple co-existence. 
For Levinas, to unite the plural through the common historicity invites 
violence and assimilation of alterity (Staehler 2010, 24). Beginning with 
the face-to-face encounter, the universal orientation of goodness follows 
which in its plural form sees peace as its priority (Morgan 2007, 263). The 
unique sense offers the communication within the plural, especially the 
encountering between two non-familiar religions, a directive and orien-
tation (rather than foundation or ground) of opening towards the other, 
the stranger, which is in fact an orientation towards peace.  
The conflict within the plural that invites judicial system for 
judgment is only conflicting when the plural is counted as the opinions 
that exist immanently enclosed within one system of experience
 
 (Levinas 
1990, 173).  But with the “unique” and “transitory moment” of disturbance 
from the sense of goodness, emerging face-to-face encounter is inspired 
by goodness where the new space that are not determined by any prior 
experience can be offered to such encounter so peace is possible, even 
when the empirical opinions are contradicting to each other.  The 
conflicting pluralism dominated by logics of duality is thus seeking inspi-
ration rather from peace, where the immanence of duality is disturbed 
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constantly and ultimately. The transcendence of peace is not just formally 
posed as opposing to the violence of immanence; rather in Levinas, this 
transcendence is clearly ethical which transcends the duality of 
immanence and non-immanence, violence and non-violence, as it is be-
yond any reasonable calculations and judicial systems, bringing in to the 
human presence with the “indeclinable responsibility” (Levinas 1990, 173). 
And in this way, peace can both presuppose pluralism and be reached 
through pluralism.  
In this sense, the pluralism seen through ethical encounter offers us a 
way to establish religious pluralism beyond any unification of religions by 
secular political value. Religious pluralism is not a negotiation on the 
content of ways of practice in religion, but each religion’s response to the 
other religion that it encounters, and the en deça of such response being 
bearing “the entire weight of all” the others (Levinas 1990, 173). In 
Levinas’s own words: the power of monotheism is to bring one man to 
reply to the other, a “work of unification” (Levinas 1990, 178). This 
unification is not to put every one of the plural into the same system or 
following the same logic; it is nowise a unification based upon 
homogeneousness, but a new way to define human, and define religious 
pluralism as a human matter. We need to stress that, the humanity that 
orients religious pluralism in Levinas is ultimately different from Kant or 
Rousse’s definition that centre on rationality or freedom (Llewelyn 1995, 
133). For Levinas, it is our ability to respond to the other, our responsibly 
for the other that defines us human which hence opens up the horizon of 
human communication as an issue of fraternity and love.   
The ultimate ethical significance of religious plurality alters the 
horizontal way of the global communication, giving it a vertical dimension 
where each encounter between two religions, each moment of this en-
counter significantly lead to peace. Pluralism can only be positive and 
plausible if it is a pluralism among human beings defined by responsibility 
and thus we can conclude, through the Levinasian religious pluralism, the 
orientation towards peace with access to fraternity that is prior to any 
empirical difference, different religions can be in a movement of non-
indifference to each other, a non-indifference we dare to call charity or 
love.  
5. Conclusion 
Therefore, from the above discussion, it can be seen that the dispu-
tation on religious pluralism in the contemporary world is partially re-
sulted from non-examined ontological presupposition of the notion of 
pluralism. Habermas is correct to shed doubts on the religious pluralism 
that does not seek any form of solidarity. However, through a Levinasian 
perspective, the searching for unification through translating any 
religious value to the political and rational realm by Habermas relies 
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wrongly on the monism logics. The Habermasian proviso does not guaran-
tee peace among the plural, which leads us to the Levinasian approach 
where we find the alternative way of establishing the conception of plu-
ralism upon face-to-face encounter. Through this unique approach, we 
revealed that religious pluralism seen from Levinas is inspired by a 
dimension of transcendence which is from a re-defined humanity that is 
always ready to respond to the alterity with charity. In this way, we reach 
the conclusion that peace and love are the dimensions of unification of 
religious pluralism, which allows both difference and guarantees against 
indifference. 
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